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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY:
THE QUESTIONABLE ROLE OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND THE
COURTS
JEFFREY L. BLEICH* AND ERIC B. WOLFF**
INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, in Morrison v. Olson, 1 Justice Scalia was so cer-
tain in his lone dissent that the Office of Independent Counsel
("OIC") was a patently unconstitutional institution that he chas-
tised his colleagues:
Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court
clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the potential of the as-
serted principle to effect important change in the equilib-
rium of power is not immediately evident, and must be dis-
cerned by a careful and perceptive analysis. But this wolf
comes as a wolf.2
Ten years later, his cry of wolf was no longer so lonesome. Af-
ter Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr has spent over $40 mil-
lion investigating President Clinton, revealed numerous embar-
rassing details about the President, and expressly urged to the
House Judiciary Committee that there were grounds for im-
* Partner, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP and adjunct professor of constitutional
law, University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall. B.A. 1983, Amherst College; M.P.P.
1986, Harvard University; J.D. 1989, University of California at Berkeley. Mr. Bleich
formerly clerked for Judge Abner J. Mikva of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit and for Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist of the United
States Supreme Court. He has represented White House personnel on legal matters, and
has provided advice to the White House Special Counsel on impeachment issues.
** Law Clerk, Judge William A. Fletcher, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. B.A. 1995, Concordia College; J.D. 1998, University of California at Ber-
keley. Mr. Wolff will clerk for Judge Stephen F. Williams of the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit following his clerkship with Judge Fletcher.
1 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (discussing constitutionality of independent counsel).
2 Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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peaching the President (which the full House eventually did), a
bipartisan chorus grew hoarse crying "Wolff." Liberals and
Democrats in particular uncharacteristically offered praise to
Justice Scalia for his "prescience" and wise "prophecy." 3 Noting
this strange bedfellows phenomenon, veteran New York Times
correspondent Linda Greenhouse remarked that during the im-
peachment proceedings: "[t]he Scalia dissent in Morrison v. Ol-
son is being cited and passed around in liberal circles like sam-
izdat."4
To some extent, in this article we join the chorus of those who
cry "wolf."5 However, we do not blame the wolf for fulfilling its
nature and being a wolf: i.e., proceeding without accountability,
expanding its prosecutorial scope, employing aggressive prosecu-
torial methods, feasting on a virtually unlimited budget, and
tending toward political jihad.6 Rather, this article focuses on
the one way in which the wolf has even today sometimes hidden
3 New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis alone has heartily endorsed the Scalia
dissent in three separate columns in roughly a year's time. See Anthony Lewis, Abuse of
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1998, at A23; Anthony Lewis, An Incurable Statute, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at A15 (commenting that Scalia forsaw problem of independent
counsel); Anthony Lewis, The Knock at the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at A19; see
also Laurence H. Tribe, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at A30 (noting
that Professor Tribe had filed amicus brief in support of constitutionality of OIC in Mor-
rison before reversing his constitutional opinion); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Madison Got It
Backward, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at A19 (indicating advocates of impeachment dis-
regard will of majority of public). Indeed, Professor Cass Sunstein offers an academic
version of "I didn't inhale" in justifying his evolving view of the Scalia dissent. See Cass
Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L. J. 2267, 2268 n.3 (1998) ('This
essay is not an endorsement of the constitutional attack on the Act urged in Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion .... But many of Justice Scalia's objections do point to seri-
ous problems in the Act, and I stress those problems as a policy matter here.").
4 Linda Greenhouse, Blank Check; Ethics in Government: The Price of Good Inten-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, at 1. To the 0.17% of the population that knows the
meaning of "samizdat," or to those who take the time to look it up, Greenhouse turned a
great phrase. Samizdat refers to suppressed materials that were secretly circulated
among Russian intellectuals in the former Soviet Union. See Charles Alan Wright &
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 30 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. §6343 n.15. "[flor those who have
forgotten, 'samizdat' is a Russian word that came to refer to unpublished manuscripts.
5 See generally Symposium: The Independent Counsel Act: From Watergate to White-
water and Beyond, 86 GEO. L. J. 2011, 2011 (1998).
6 The sound and fury of Democrats in this regard merely echoes the howls of protest
by Republicans in the Reagan era. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr has yet to break
the records for the longest or most expensive OIC reign, both of which were set investi-
gating officials in the Reagan administration. Laurence Walsh, who investigated the
"Iran-Contra" scandal for six years, spent the most - $48.5 million. See Marc Lacey &
Eric Lichtblau, Independent Counsel Law Faces Reform - or Demise, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1999, at Al. The eight-year investigation of Reagan administration Housing Secretary
Samuel Pierce was the longest. Id. See also Susan Page, Are Independent Counsels Out
of Control?, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1997, at Al. Starr's investigation, however, is not yet
complete. Id.
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its nature and pretended to be a sheep: namely, when it submits
that questions of presidential power and behavior are as suitable
for resolution by the courts. The source of the problem, and its
wooly disguise, is best described in the words of Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr in his testimony to the House Judiciary
Committee:
[The OIC has] been forced to go to court time and again to
seek information from the Executive Branch and to fight a
multitude of privilege claims asserted by the administration,
every single one of which we have won .... We go to court
and not on the talk show circuit. And our record shows that
there is a bright line between law and politics, between
courts and polls. It leaves the polls to the politicians and
spin doctors. We are officers of the court who live in the
world of the law. We have presented our cases in court, and
with very rare exception, we have won. 7
This article does not dispute that the OIC has been victorious
in the legal challenges it has brought; rather, we contend that by
using its license to operate outside the normal rules of legisla-
tive-executive relations, the OIC forced battles that should never
have been fought.
Even if, as his critics claim, President Clinton has had a
"habit" of invoking privileges, 8 Independent Counsel Starr has
appeared at least equally addicted to not taking "no" for an an-
swer. Starr took it upon himself to force disclosures from the
President through litigation,9 rather than leave this task to the
political branches. The price of such showdowns has been to
place before the judicial branch, as opposed to the legislative
branch, basically political questions regarding executive immu-
7 Testimony of Kenneth W. Starr, House Judiciary Committee, Nov. 19, 1998 (com-
menting on efforts of OIC since he assumed control).
8 See William Safire, Privilege Proliferation, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 1998, A29 (stating
President Clinton has not been as reluctant to invoke executive privilege as previous
presidents); John C. Yoo, A Privileged Executive?, WALL ST. J., March 2, 1998, at A19 (in-
dicating President Clinton has invoked executive privilege at least six times).
9 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (attorney-client privi-
lege); In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (White House counsel
privilege); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Secret Service "protec-
tive function privilege"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 925 (8th Cir. 1997)
(White House counsel privilege); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 39
(D.D.C. 1998) (executive privilege). A different independent counsel, Donald Smaltz, liti-
gated a White House claim of executive privilege that arose in the investigation of
Clinton Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy. In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 550, 557 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
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nity and privilege, which can and should be answered only
through a delicate balancing of interests. As we will argue, such
a political balancing act should, for the most part, be undertaken
by Congress, not the judiciary. By forcing a decision in the
courts on executive privilege issues, the OIC has destabilized
relations between the President and the Congress and altered
the relative balance of powers.
This article considers specifically how the OIC has effectively
enlisted the judiciary to overstep its role in resolving issues of
executive privilege and immunity. Section I summarizes the so-
cietal interests that are generally offered to support extending
executive privilege and executive immunity. Section II surveys
the law of executive privilege and executive immunity, and de-
scribes how the interests of the Executive Branch have generally
been treated. It concludes that while courts have created a mix-
ture of bright line rules and balancing tests that do not adhere to
any unifying doctrine, the touchstone of all parties formerly was
one of caution. In any case of first impression, the parties and
the courts tend to favor some sort of balancing between, on the
one hand, the needs of Congress, the OIC, the criminal justice
system, or the civil justice system, and on the other hand, the
needs of the President. Section III critiques this balancing act
from two perspectives, first, from the traditional view about the
flaws of any ad hoc balancing system, and second, from the point
of view of advocating judicial restraint when political questions
are at issue. Section IV considers how to fulfill the constitu-
tional objectives of "the people," particularly, how the system
should address difficult questions of democracy and constitu-
tional definition rather than shuttling these matters off to the
most politically unaccountable institutions we have: Article III
courts and politically independent prosecutors.
We conclude that in order to maintain a healthy dialogue be-
tween the President and Congress, Congress must accede to, and
the judiciary should recede from, the balancing of important gov-
ernmental interests involved in issues of executive privilege and
immunity. Critical questions, on which the public should weigh
in, involve what the public wants to know from the President,
how badly the public wants to know it, and whether the public
wants its elected leader reconciled with the law. This may not
require courts actually to refrain from deciding constitutional is-
[Vol. 14:15
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sues when they are presented in a concrete case. Rather, the in-
stitutions responsible for investigating presidential misconduct
should be reconfigured so as to diminish recourse to the judiciary
and to force recourse to more politically accountable actors.
I. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES
Although courts and commentators have often reflected on the
sources and contours of executive power, in the end, there is a
noticeable lack of any real authority on the subject. As Justice
Jackson put it in a related context:
A judge ... may be surprised at the poverty of really useful
and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems
of executive power as they actually present themselves ...
A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly
speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or
less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of
any question. 10
Three decades later, the Court could quote Justice Jackson
without the need to make any qualifications. 11
Nevertheless, surveying the authority that does exist suggests
at least the principal interests that exist for recognizing some
form of executive privilege and executive immunity in certain
contexts. First, the presidential function is so important to the
public interest that it may require insulating Presidents from
harassing or distracting litigation burdens, at least while in of-
fice. Second, the President, by virtue of his office, may be
uniquely vulnerable to collateral litigation, politically inspired
attacks, and opportunistic media embarrassment. Third, ex-
cusing the President from disclosing information may be neces-
sary because even certain truthful information in the possession
of the President, if revealed, may compromise national interests
or the stature of the presidency. And fourth, the prospect that
information communicated to the President might some day be-
come public may chill advisors and the President from having
candid and useful exchanges. We consider each of these inter-
10 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
11 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981).
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ests in turn.
A. The Importance of the President's Time and Attention:
If nothing else, lawsuits accomplish one thing: a vast exchange
of information that would otherwise be confidential, embarrass-
ing, guarded, or just numbingly trivial. One of the prices of the
rule of law is that any individual, no matter how important his
or her responsibilities, may be hurled into this information pit if
a colorable legal claim is made against that person.
Courts have found limited ways to show some respect for the
time of people whose work-presence is in great demand and is
required for important things. As a practical matter, for exam-
ple, discovery referees and judges will tend to place greater lim-
its on the taking of a deposition of a chief executive - denying
discovery if the information sought is too tangential, or at least
imposing strict limits on deposition scope and length. 12
Arguably, the need for accommodations afforded to, say, the
mayor of a city or the CEO of a company pale in comparison to
the accommodations needed when the object of the request for
information is the President. President Johnson used to com-
plain that during the time he was in the White House, he never
went to bed before 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. and never got up after 6:00
or 6:30 a.m. 13 The President is tugged into virtually every world
event from representing the U.S. in important foreign policy
summits to'attending funerals as the United States' head of
state. Because of the demands on their time, Presidents may be
more vulnerable to litigation burdens than ordinary litigants,
and this could harm the public interest. As the Supreme Court
has observed, "[b]ecause of the singular importance of the Presi-
dent's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private
lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of
government." 14
The burden on the Executive, moreover, is not simply on the
President's time but also upon the time of dozens of people
whose accomplishment or non-accomplishment of their function
12 District courts have broad discretionary powers and may even issue stays "if the
public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted." See Landis v. North American
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936).
13 LYNDON JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT 425 (1971).
14 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982).
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goes largely unseen by the public. Because a President's activi-
ties are monitored constantly through various means and by
countless people, a President and his staff are particularly sus-
ceptible to onerous discovery demands. The entire office - secu-
rity guards, secretaries, heads of state, photographers, etc. -
may have relevant information and be forced to surrender it in
litigations. The volume of material responsive to any request
may be substantial. The imposition on a President's time thus
may go far beyond the President.
B. Vulnerability:
A concern related to the risk to the President's time and atten-
tion is that a President is uniquely susceptible to opportunistic
"journalism," and being drawn into politically-motivated or col-
lateral litigation. As a general matter, colorable legal claims
tend to migrate toward defendants with deep pockets, high pub-
lic profiles, and/or vast potential enemies. The President meets
all of these criteria. As the Supreme Court noted in giving the
President immunity from civil suit for actions taken as Presi-
dent:
As is the case with prosecutors and judges - for whom ab-
solute immunity now is established - a President must con-
cern himself with matters likely to 'arouse the most intense
feelings.' Rn] view of the visibility of his office and the effect
of his actions on countless people, the President would be an
easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages. Cogni-
zance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract
a President from his public duties, to the detriment not only
of the President and his office but also the [Nation]. 15
Of course, the vulnerability of presidents to civil suits for unof-
ficial actions, or actions taken before becoming President, was at
the heart of the scandal involving President Clinton.
Aside from vulnerability ultimately manifested in a civil law-
suit, presidents must endure a more general vulnerability that
could lead to the distraction of a lawsuit or an impeachment in-
quiry, but usually just involves embarrassing opportunistic
"journalism." President Johnson's adage that the higher the
15 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 751.
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monkey climbs up the tree the more you see of his back-side has
been proven true time and again. Some media, particularly in
the last few years, may be justly criticized for upping the stakes
by taking a telephoto lens to the President's "back-side."' 16
While presidents should not, and could not, be given immunity
from having to disclose anything that they would find embar-
rassing, there may be some legitimate interest in placing limits
on what a President is forced to reveal given the unique vulner-
ability of the President to the distractions of opportunistic "jour-
nalism."
A related concern is that if a sitting President is readily sus-
ceptible to civil and criminal litigation, a significant premium is
placed on every word, action, and disclosure made by the Presi-
dent. This type of disclosure may have an avalanche effect that
occasionally warrants allowing a President to remain silent (and
suffer its consequences) rather than open his mouth or files and
have his entire administration haled before a grand jury. Some-
times any truthful testimony is damaging and may invite collat-
eral litigation; for example, when President Reagan attempted to
explain that he was unable to recall events relating to the Iran-
Contra controversy, he was accused of being either untruthful or,
if truthful, then senile and incompetent. Without immunity or
privileges, candor can have civil and criminal implications, as
can any perceived lack of candor. Inadvertent failures to pro-
duce documents, contradictory testimony, or other snafus -
while common in litigation - are particularly damaging to a
President. Once forced into civil litigation or criminal litigation,
the President may find that the political costs of exercising the
rights of an ordinary litigant - to settle a lawsuit to acknowledge
failures of memory, or to assert Fifth Amendment privilege -
make such rights illusory.
16 Former President Carter used to tell the story of a reporter from a New York pa-
per whose entire task during the 1976 presidential election was to document every in-
stance in his life when Carter had lied. Frustrated that she wasn't able to unearth any
instances of lying even from grade school classmates, political rivals, and former employ-
ees, the reporter finally turned to Carter's mother, Ms. Lillian, and asked whether Carter
had ever told a lie in his entire life. Carter took particular glee in recounting that his
mother was willing to concede that he had lied, saying that she was sure he told some
white lies. When the reporter demanded to know what Ms. Lillian meant by "white lies,"
Ms. Lillian explained: "well, you know, how when I greeted you I told you how nice it was
to meet you and how pretty you looked..."
[Vol. 14:15
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C. Sensitive Information:
Presidents, by their position, know things that should not be
made public because the information is damaging to important
national interests or the stature of the presidency. When con-
sidering executive privilege, the Supreme Court rejected an "un-
differentiated claim of public interest," but was keenly aware of
the need for a privilege with respect to "military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets."17
Apart from "sensitive" policy areas is a concern about requir-
ing Presidents to disclose "intimate" information that, although
not about substantive policy, would diminish the office of the
Presidency if revealed. In this respect a litigation privilege may
allow a President to be, for lack of a better term, more presiden-
tial. This category of information that hurts the President's
stature may include things as varied as the President's choice of
underwear, 18 sexual activities, or private views about other
world leaders. Lawsuits, unfortunately, are uncompromising in
their demands. A President who lacks special protections may
have to answer questions about private acts or views that, when
answered honestly, do real damage to the institution, and when
answered elliptically (or dishonestly), do much wors
D. Chilling Effect:
Perhaps the most common reason offered for giving the Presi-
dent latitude to withhold information is that candor will be com-
promised, and decision-making will be impaired, if the President
and his advisers feel that they will be confronted by their words
some time later in some unknown context. As the Supreme
Court noted when establishing executive privilege, "[t]he meet-
ings of the constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in
complete privacy [and] all records of those meetings were sealed
for more than 30 years.... Most of the Framers acknowledged
that without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was devel-
oped could have been written."1 9 When the United States Sen-
17 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
18 See David M. Stoloff, 'Boxers or Briefs'girl recalls fleeting fame; Question to Presi-
dent now seems tame, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, at All (discussing MTV program
where Clinton was asked to state his favorite type of undergarment).
19 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 n.15 (quoting C. WARREN, THE MAKING
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ate itself dealt with President Clinton's impeachment trial for
lack of candor, many members commented on the candor and
comradery engendered by closed sessions.20
A President, or presidential aide, who believes his or her pri-
vate statements and actions will be flushed out into public pro-
ceedings will likely hold back those statements out of a concern
either for appearances or some other self-interest, and ultimately
this may undermine the decision-making process. The Supreme
Court recognized the "valid need for protection of communica-
tions between high Government officials and those who advise
and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the
importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further
discussion."2 1 Taking this cue, we offer no further discussion on
this point.
E. Summary:
In sum, at least four interests exist that would justify - to
some degree or other - granting the President some special
privilege or immunity: (1) the time and attention of the Presi-
dent as a unique power in the government, (2) the unique vul-
nerability of the President to attacks through litigation and me-
dia abuses, (3) the need to restrict access to sensitive information
held by the President, and (4) the need for candid conversations
within the Executive Branch. Our point is not that these inter-
ests, as we have described them, compel a legal privilege or im-
munity of any particular dimension, but rather, that these inter-
ests are all important and serious enough that when
determining whether such a privilege or immunity exists, these
interests deserve thoughtful consideration. The next step is to
review how, as a matter of method and doctrine, the other
branches of government, primarily the judiciary, have dealt with
these interests.
II. DETERMINING ExEcuTIvE PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY
There are several privileges that executive branch officials
OF THE CONSTITUTION 134-39 (1937)).
20 See Frank Bruni & Katharine Q. Seelye, Private Debates, Rare and Remarkable,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at A19.
21 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705.
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may invoke, and it is important to define precisely what we
mean when we use the terms "presidential privilege" and "presi-
dential immunity" in this article. Privileges that may be invoked
by executive officials include qualified rights to withhold infor-
mation regarding state secrets, government informers, pending
investigations, and deliberative processes. 22 Executive officials
also have qualified immunity for official actions. 23 In this arti-
cle, however, we are concerned solely with the executive privilege
and immunity of the President. A more apt description of this
privilege is "presidential communications privilege."24 Although
the privileges of executive officials are "in general no stranger to
the courtroom," the "presidential communications privilege"
arises relatively rarely, and the same is true for presidential
immunity.25 Thus, the bad news is, whatever the merits of our
analysis, there is not likely to be a great deal of opportunity for
practical application in this area. The good news is the same.
The leading cases, and there are only a few, involve President
Nixon and President Clinton. In each instance, the judiciary
performed a rather ad hoc balancing test of executive branch in-
terests versus the interests of Congress, the criminal justice sys-
tem, or the civil justice system. In general, the resulting stan-
dard for executive privilege requires ad hoc balancing in every
instance outside of highly sensitive national information. As for
executive immunity, the balance tipped so sharply in the Presi-
dent's favor regarding civil immunity for official actions that the
Supreme Court formulated a rule of absolute immunity. How-
ever, with respect to civil suits while the President is in office
but based on unofficial actions outside the "perimeter" of his of-
fice, the Supreme Court instructed district courts to perform ad
hoc balancing. No case to date has decided the issue of criminal
immunity. The relevant cases will be discussed in categories of
bright line rules, balancing tests, and no rules at all.
22 See In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 550, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1997) [hereinafter "The Espy
Case"] (compiling cases of privileges allowed to executive officials). White House coun-
sels have claimed attorney-client privilege for discussions with executive branch officials,
including the President, but these claims were rejected. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148
F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910,
925 (8th Cir. 1997).
23 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 800 (1982).
24 The Espy Case, 116 F.3d at 573.
25 Id. at 558-59.
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A. Bright Line Rules:
As a panel of the D.C. Circuit remarked as recently as 1997,
the cases involving President Nixon remain "the leading - if not
the only - decisions on the scope of the presidential communica-
tions privilege."26 The basic doctrine of the presidential commu-
nications privilege is a case-by-case balancing test. But when
the Supreme Court initially established this framework, certain
highly sensitive presidential communications were excluded
from the balance. The holding of United States v. Nixon is that
when a "generalized interest in confidentiality" is asserted, that
interest can be overcome by an adequate showing of need for use
in a criminal trial. The Court expressly distinguished more par-
ticularized claims of privilege, such as for "military, diplomatic,
or sensitive national security secrets."27 The D.C. Circuit inter-
prets this reservation as implying that "claims of privilege for
military and state secrets would be close to absolute."28  The
public interest in the confidentiality of such information so
greatly outweighs most needs that no ad hoc case-by-case bal-
ancing would really be necessary.
For presidential immunity, there is absolute immunity from
civil suit for official actions taken as President. 29 This immunity
is grounded in the "unique position in the constitutional scheme"
occupied by the President,30 as well as a weighing of the poten-
tial detriment to the public interest in having a President dis-
tracted or fearful of civil lawsuits, which the Court believed were
very much possible given the President's "sheer prominence" as
an "identifiable target for suits for civil damages." 31 The per-
ceived threat to the public interest goes beyond mere distraction,
however, because the Court concluded that "[a]mong the most
persuasive reasons supporting official immunity" was concern
that the President might be excessively cautious in the discharge
26 Id. at 562-63.
27 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-713 (1974).
28 The Espy Case, 121 F.3d at 743 n.12. See also MURL A. LARKIN, FEDERAL
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 6.01[l] (1998) "To the extent that the material sought to be
protected extends to military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security interests, it is
absolutely protected under an executive privilege that covers such matters." Id.
29 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752 (1982).
30 See id. at 749.
31 Id. at 752-53.
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of official duties out of fear of civil damages. 32 After balancing
the interests, the balance tipped so sharply in favor of the Presi-
dent that the Court was able to lay down a bright line rule.
B. Ad Hoc Balancing Tests:
The core of the presidential communications privilege involves
generalized interests in confidentiality, rather than specific
claims relating to national security. For such claims, the Su-
preme Court has held that case-by-case balancing, usually in-
cluding in camera inspection of the evidence by a trial judge, is
the proper approach to resolving these disputes. The doctrine is
succinctly stated as follows:
The President can invoke the privilege when asked to pro-
duce documents or other materials that reflect presidential
decision-making and deliberations and that the President
believes should remain confidential. If the President does
so, the documents become presumptively privileged. How-
ever, the privilege is qualified, not absolute, and can be
overcome by an adequate showing of need. If a court be-
lieves that an adequate showing of need has been demon-
strated, it should then proceed to review the documents in
camera to excise non-relevant material.33
What is an "adequate showing of need?" In United States v.
Nixon, the Court stated that the presidential communications
privilege "must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evi-
dence in a pending criminal trial," the material must be "essen-
tial to the justice of the [pending criminal] case," and the mate-
rial must be "shown to have some bearing on the pending
criminal cases." 34 In The Espy Case, the D.C. Circuit could not
makes heads or tails of these cryptic assertions, whether the evi-
dence need only be "relevant" to a criminal case, or whether it
must be "critical to an accurate judicial determination." 35 The
32 See id. at 752 n.32.
33 The Espy Case, 121 F.3d at 744-45.
34 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
35 The Espy Case, 121 F.3d at 753-54. Compounding the confusion was that the Court
in Nixon stated that "on the basis of our examination of the record," the Court was satis-
fied that a sufficient showing of need was made, but the Court never elaborated on what
it saw in the record that it found so satisfying. Id. For an interesting deciphering of what
the Court meant by "need" in United States v. Nixon, see Brett M. Kavanaugh, The
President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L. J. 2133, 2169-70 (1998). Kavanaugh
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D.C. Circuit set forth a two-part test for adequate need: "first,
that each discrete group of the subpoenaed materials likely con-
tains important evidence; and second, that this evidence is not
available with due diligence elsewhere." 36 The ad hoc balancing
of United States v. Nixon has also been held to apply in three
civil cases, but none of these decisions reached the Supreme
Court.37
The ad hoc balancing of the presidential communications
privilege has also been applied in contexts not involving requests
for information in criminal and civil cases. Congress can require
by law that the President (or a former President) disclose infor-
mation, and the Court looks to whether the request is "unduly
disruptive of the Executive Branch."38 When former- President
Nixon refused to turn over materials from his presidential pa-
pers to government archivists acting under the authority of the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974,
the Court held that this "limited intrusion into executive confi-
dentiality" was warranted given the "substantial public interest"
in a "desire to restore public confidence in our political processes
by preserving the materials as a source for facilitating a full
airing of the events leading to [Nixon's] resignation."39
With respect to presidential immunity, the President has no
immunity from civil suits for unofficial action. 40 Thus, the Su-
preme Court held that Paula Jones' sexual harassment lawsuit
was allowed to proceed against President Clinton while he was
in office. However, the Supreme Court found "there is no reason
to assume that the District Courts will be either unable to ac-
concluded that no showing beyond relevance is necessary to defeat a generalized claim of
executive privilege. Id. The author, who worked with the Independent Counsel, argued
that Judge Silberman had the proper analysis in United States v. North, even though his
colleagues on the D.C. Circuit did not agree in the Espy case. See also United States v.
North, 910 F.2d 843, 950-53 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). Judge Silberman argued that only a showing of relevance was required. Id.;
The Espy Case, 121 F.3d at 753-54. This case took exception to Judge Silberman's posi-
tion and required a showing beyond mere relevance. Id.
36 Id. at 754.
37 See Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (regarding civil action for
conspiracy to deprive civil rights); Halperin v. Kissinger, 401 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975)
(involving civil action over illegal wiretapping); Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d
1020 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (alleging breach of a government contract).
38 Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Svcs., 433 U.S. 425, 445 (1977).
39 Id. at 453.
40 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692-97 (1997) (explaining that scope of protec-
tion is limited to official actions).
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commodate the President's needs or unfaithful to tradition - es-
pecially in matters involving national security - of giving 'the
utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities. '41 The district
courts were thus directed to balance the competing needs of the
civil plaintiff, the President, and the public interests the Presi-
dent embodies.
There have been other instances when a President's testimony
or evidence is necessary in a legal proceeding that is not directed
at the President, and the courts have made accommodations
without incident. Presidents have preferred to give testimony
voluntarily and can use the threat of executive privilege as a way
of dictating the terms of their participation. In fact, no sitting
President has ever testified, or been ordered to testify, in open
court. 42 President Jefferson, for example, was excused as a wit-
ness in Marbury v. Madison, based apparently on an accommo-
dation between the parties and the Court. President Grant vol-
untarily gave a written deposition in a criminal case instead of
appearing in person, President Carter gave videotaped (as op-
posed to live) testimony at a criminal trial, and President Ford
agreed to appear by deposition in a criminal trial (rather than
give live testimony) against his would-be assassin, Squeaky
Fromme. 43 Even President Clinton twice gave videotaped testi-
mony in criminal proceedings involving defendants in the
Whitewater case without raising any fuss. 44 In practice, there-
fore, Courts generally accept limited compliance from the Presi-
dent when the President is not the focus of the proceeding.
C. No Doctrine:
There are two significant areas of presidential communications
privilege and presidential immunity that are almost completely
without doctrine. First, courts have formulated very little doc-
trine regarding congressional requests for information as part of
congressional oversight and investigations. Second, courts have
41 Id. at 709.
42 See id. at 692 n.14.
43 See id. at 705 (collecting examples of presidential testimony in judicial proceed-
ings).
44 See United States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296, 298 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (allowing
testimony of President Clinton to be videotaped); United States v. Branscum, No. LR-CR-
96-49 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
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never been called upon to decide whether a sitting President has
immunity from criminal proceedings, in particular, a criminal
indictment.
As of 1974, thirteen presidents had resisted twenty requests
for documents that Congress sought regardless of the President's
private opinion. 45 The basis presidents asserted for withholding
documents included concerns that disclosure would not be in the
public interest, that the information relates to matters falling
outside the legislatures' competence, or that disclosing the in-
formation would unfairly injure innocent persons' reputations. 46
Historically, Presidents did not obtain judicial determinations,
because the only means of doing so would be to refuse to produce
the information, accept a citation for contempt of Congress, and
then either challenge the citation or wait for Congress to try to
enforce it.47 Accordingly, "[t]o avoid extreme 'brinksmanship' on
the part of both branches, most disputes over requested informa-
tion were resolved through negotiation, without a formal privi-
lege claim."48 Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt voluntarily ap-
peared before congressional committees. President Grant
voluntarily sent a deposition in a congressional investigation. In
response to a committee summons, ex-president John Tyler testi-
fied, and former president John Quincy Adams also sent a depo-
sition.
In those rare instances where Presidents have not complied
with subpoenas, Congress has tended to back down.49 These, in-
cluded, for example, President Truman's decision to ignore a
subpoena from the House Un-American Activities Committee
45 See Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1395-1405 (1974)
(indicating past presidents bespoke of a broad discretion). Compare The Espy Case, 121
F.3d at 739 n.9 ("Although scholars dispute how often Presidents have actually refused to
provide Congress with information on grounds of executive privilege, debate over the
President's ability to withhold confidential information from Congress has occurred since
the early years of our nation .... ).
46 Among others, President Washington gave Congress information on General St.
Clair's military expeditions, but did so only after taking "an affirmative position on the
right of the executive branch to withhold information." See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACOuNTABILITY 34 (1994).
Washington in fact later invoked executive privilege and refused to comply with the Sen-
ate's request for the correspondence of French Minister Morris and the House's request
for information relating to negotiation of the Jay Treaty. Id. at 35. President Adams as-
serted his right to withhold information during the XYZ Affair in 1798. Id. at 36.
47 See SHANE & BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 180 (1988).
48 Id.
49 See Cox, supra note 45, at 1395-1405 (acknowledging that there is no common
practice in Executive Branch for responding to Congressional requests).
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and give no direct response or explanation to Congress. 50 In
each instance, Congress did not invoke its contempt powers, de-
spite threats to the contrary. For example, when the Senate
threatened to imprison an executive in the Theodore Roosevelt
administration for not producing certain data, President Roose-
velt reportedly "with great relish ordered the papers to the
White House and challenged the Senate to come and get them."
It never did. 51
More recently, Presidents have developed specific protocols for
when they will not comply with congressional requests for infor-
mation, and the principles supporting any claim of privilege. 52
The Reagan White House determined that it would not disclose
"national security secrets, deliberative commun-ications that
form a part of the decision-making process, or other information
important to the discharge of the Executive Branch's constitu-
tional responsibilities." 53
Surveying the actual case law in this area, the D.C. Circuit re-
cently acknowledged that judicial intervention has been reluc-
tant and mercifully rare. "[The courts have been drawn into ex-
ecutive-congressional disputes over access to information on only
three recent occasions." 54 In those instances, the courts have
tended to favor requiring the political branches to work out some
sort of compromise. For example, in AT&T, the D.C. Circuit was
confronted with a request by a House Committee for materials
relating to warrantless wiretaps allegedly authorized by the Ex-
ecutive Branch. Rather than resolve the dispute on its merits,
the Court of Appeals remanded the dispute, suggesting the par-
ties settle: "This dispute between the legislative and executive
50 See ROZELL, supra note 46, at 43. Truman responded through an executive order
insuring the confidentiality of loyalty files, and he even directed members of his staff not
to appear before the committee after they had been subpoenaed to appear. Id.
51 See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 84 (1973); ROZELL, su-
pro note 46, at 42. Roosevelt told Congress it would have to impeach him to obtain the
documents. Id.
52 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-435, at 1106 (1985).
53 Id.
54 The Espy Case, 121 F.3d at 739 n.10. See United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384,
395 (D.C.Cir. 1976) (court encouraged settlement); Senate Select Committee on Presiden-
tial Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that sub-
poenaed materials were not "critical to the performance" of the committee's legislative
functioning," therefore it was not necessary to disclose them); United States v. House of
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983) (stating that while settlement of
intra-governmental constitutional disputes is favored, judicial intervention should be
avoided until it is necessary).
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branches has a least some elements of the political-question doc-
trine. A court decision selects a victor, and tends thereafter to
tilt the scales. A compromise worked out between the branches
is most likely to meet their essential needs and the country's
constitutional balance." 55 When the Department of Justice and
the House still were not able to hammer out a resolution, the
Court imposed a compromise on the parties, applying relatively
pliant standards of review in an approach the D.C. Circuit
dubbed "gradualism," as in a gradual move toward settlement. 56
Similarly, in a 1983 case, the House of Representatives cited
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch with contempt for failure to
produce documents to Congress. The U.S. Attorney who received
the contempt referral refused to prosecute, and the Department
of Justice sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate the House
subpoena, which was the occasion for judicial involvement. The
court dismissed the suit and urged the parties to "settle their dif-
ferences without further judicial involvement," basically coun-
seling that "[c]ompromise and cooperation, rather than confron-
tation, should be the aim of the parties."57 With respect to the
judicial role, the court stated that in such a dispute, "judicial in-
tervention should be delayed until all possibilities for settlement
have been exhausted."58
Unlike confrontations over information between the President
and Congress, the courts have not even had the opportunity to
abstain from deciding whether or not a sitting President is im-
mune from a criminal indictment. 59 It has been widely reported
that the Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr be-
lieves a sitting president can be indicted.60 Others, most notably
55 United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d at 394.
56 See United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 131-33 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (proposing
gradulaism approach); see also Lisa A. Kloppenburg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71
IND. L.J. 297, 332-39 (1996) (discussing principle of gradualism in constitutional law).
57 United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.C.C. 1983).
58 Id. at 152. Compare Senate Select Committee, 498 F.2d at 731 (preceding United
States v. Nixon and holding that President did not have to turn over tapes to Senate
committee because Senate committee had not demonstrated that tapes were "demon-
strably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions," mainly be-
cause tapes were already in possession of another congressional committee).
59 See Linda Greenhouse, Indicting a President, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at Al(noting general consensus that presidential immunity from criminal prosecution is not
explicitly provided by Constitution and has not been challenged).
60 See Don Van Atta, Jr., Starr is Weighing Whether To Indict Sitting President, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at 1.
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Robert Bork, believe an indictment of a sitting President would
be unconstitutional. 61 Justice Departments under both Demo-
crats and Republicans have taken the position that a sitting
President cannot be indicted.62 At the time of this writing, there
remains speculation that Independent Counsel Starr will test his
constitutional hypothesis. Such testing of constitutional limits
by the OIC is at the heart of this article's concerns.63
D. Summary:
The only method that the judiciary has developed for resolving
disputes over the presidential communications privilege and
presidential immunity is to balance the competing interests of
the various branches of government and the public, or at least
such balancing appears to be the driving force behind the deci-
sions. In some cases, the balance so clearly tips in favor of the
President that a bright-line rule is formulated. More often, how-
ever, the judiciary can offer nothing more than ad hoc case-by-
case balancing of interests.
III.CRITIQUING DECISIONS ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND
IMMUNITY
Contemporary commentators speaking of United States v.
Nixon made the following appraisal, which, with modifications,
fits all of the presidential privilege and immunity cases: "the
principal argument for limiting [or accepting] presidential dis-
cretion - for drawing the boundaries of law so as to include a
presidential duty to disclose [or privilege not to disclose] evi-
61 Robert H. Bork, Clinton, Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A19.
62 See David A. Strauss, Indicting the President, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, at A19
(cautioning that indicting sitting president would be extraordinary act).
63 Although the constitutionality of indicting a sitting President remains an open
question, a small step toward a judicial decision in this regard came when Judge Susan
Webber Wright cited President Clinton for civil contempt, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37 and the inherent authority of the district court, for impeding discovery with
false and misleading answers in this civil deposition. See Jones v. Clinton, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4515 (E.D. Ark. April 12, 1999). Judge Wright's contempt citation, which
consisted of a rebuke, monetary sanctions, and referral to the Arkansas Supreme Court
for disciplinary proceedings, avoided the serious constitutional objections to jailing a sit-
ting president; Judge Wright recognized that "significant constitutional issues would
arise were this Court to impose sanctions against the President that impaired his deci-
sion-making or otherwise impaired him in the performance of his official duties." Id. at
*21. Nevertheless, Judge Wright acknowledged that she was committing a significant
first: no court had ever held a President in contempt of court. Id. at *18.
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dence - was an appeal to the importance of the interests that
would be harmed if the claim of presidential discretion were up-
held [or defeated]. ' 64 Simply put, the decisions on presidential
privilege and immunity are driven not so much by constitutional
text, history, or structure, but by a balancing of primarily public
interests. In this respect, it has been said that the Court's deci-
sion on the "generalized constitutionally-based privilege"
emerged "full-blown from the head of the Court."65 The same
can be said for the decisions regarding presidential immunity.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court felt that there would be more
public harm than good in allowing civil suits based on the official
actions of a President - i.e. too distracting, might make the
President overly cautious, the President is too vulnerable. How-
ever, in Clinton v. Jones, the Court thought that the balance was
different - the President will likely not be as vulnerable to suits
based on unofficial action, a respectful district judge should be
able to keep the litigation from being overly distracting.
Such ad hoc balancing is frequently criticized, and we will
briefly visit the standard criticisms below. However, in many
cases, the Court simply has no better way of dealing with a case
or an issue that requires constitutional interpretation. The
problem with the presidential privilege and immunity cases is
that the issues before the Court, although constitutional and "le-
gal," are also profoundly political and capable of resolution by
the political branches. The Court dismissed the notion that the
issues in United States v. Nixon were "political questions." After
all, the Court protested it is "emphatically the duty and province
of the courts to say what the law is," and who were they to ques-
tion the wisdom of Marbury v. Madison? At the time, however,
and now over twenty years later, there remain serious questions
about the participation of the judicial branch in resolving issues
of presidential privilege and immunity. This section considers
both the impact of (1) the absence of a more concrete method
than ad hoc balancing for resolution of presidential privilege and
immunity questions, and (2) the structural effects of seeking re-
course for privilege and immunity disputes in the judiciary (par-
64 Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative and Judicial
Review, 22 UCLA L. REV. 47, 65 (1974).
65 Paul J. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon,
22 UCLA L. REV. 76, 83-84 (1974).
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ticularly in light of the OIC's gravitation toward judicial resolu-
tion). Our conclusion is that given the lack of manageable stan-
dards and the structural harm caused by courts, their use should
be minimized.
A. The Problem with Ad Hoc Balancing:
Professor Sullivan describes balancing as a "standard-like"
framing of doctrine which "explicitly considers all relevant fac-
tors with an eye to the underlying purposes or background prin-
ciples or policies at stake."66  Professor Aleinikoff hews more
closely to the traditional image of weights on a scale, describing
balancing tests as "based on the identification, valuation, and
comparison of competing interests." 67 There are some scholars
who find balancing a preferable way to frame doctrine. Balanc-
ing tests embody a "civic republican commitment to 'resolving
normative disputes by conversation, a communicative practice of
open and intelligible reason-giving."' 68 And, balancing could be
praised as judicial "minimalism," a narrow and shallow case-by-
case approach capable of adjusting to incomplete information
and changing circumstances. 69 The Supreme Court's resolution
of presidential privilege and immunity cases may indeed have
some of these attributes. 70
However, balancing tests can at times look less than judicial.
As Professor Fallon puts it: "[B]y what right does a court substi-
tute its judgment for the reasonable view of politically account-
able institutions concerning a disputable issue?"7 1 In fact, it is
legislatures and other politically accountable institutions that
66 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 60 (1992).
67 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J.
943, 945 (1987).
68 Sullivan, supra note 66, at 68 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self- Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 34-35 (1986)).
69 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6,
8 n.8 (1996) (suggesting a more modest and cautious judicial role); See also Christopher
J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 412 (1997) (proposing
that judicial minimalism in constitutional review could increase democratic legitimacy of
constitutional adjudication).
70 Consider, in this regard, the following appraisal of United States v. Nixon: "In
United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court offered no apology for its legislative weighing
of interests. That candor in itself merits our applause." See Karst & Horowitz, supra
note 64, at 65.
71 Richard H. Fallon, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV.
54, 80 (1997).
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are supposed to make appraisals of the public good and weigh
various policy options. Justice Scalia echoes such concerns over
the misallocation of political power in balancing tests and adds
the serious conundrum of "weighing" various values and inter-
ests that are incommensurable. Justice Scalia's now classic for-
mulation of this critique is that some balancing tests call for
measuring whether a particular line is as long as a particular
rock is heavy. 72
Indeed, there is something a bit surreal and incommensurable
in weighing the President's need for candid conversation in the
White House against the demands of the criminal justice system;
or, the vulnerability of the President to civil lawsuits against the
principle that no person is above the law. Judge Leventhal of
the D.C. Circuit referred to the "unseemliness of a judicial explo-
ration of the needs and motives of the other two branches."73 In
what way does the Supreme Court, or any court, have a superior
knowledge or basis for resolving this balance? A court must act
as John Dewey's farmer did in weighing a pig: it puts the pig on
one side of a scale, puts rocks on the other side, and - once it is
balanced - guesses the weight of the rocks. 74 It has been ob-
served that the balancing undertaken in United States v. Nixon
is truly "supported far more by the fiat of the Justices' commis-
sions than by the weight of either learning or reasoning."75 The
balancing itself was based on "the Justices' perception of social
good" and has been characterized as a "legislative" or "super-
legislative" "weighing of interests." 76 In fact, Justice Scalia said
much the same about the Court's rejection of the constitutional
challenge to the OIC: "Taking all things into account, we con-
clude that the power taken away from the President here is not
really too much.... This is not analysis; it is ad hoc judg-
ment.... The ad hoc approach to constitutional adjudication has
real attraction, even apart from its work-saving potential. It is
guaranteed to produce a result, in every case, that will make a
72 See Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
73 United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
74 See M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 29 (1981) (comparing
this system of measurement to judicial efforts to calculate prison capacity).
75 See Mishkin, supra note 65, at 76.
76 See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 64, at 65.
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majority of the Court happy with the law. The law is, by defini-
tion, precisely what the majority thinks, taking all things into
account, it ought to be."77
No one, including Justice Scalia, believes that ad hoc balanc-
ing tests can be rendered extinct. As Justice Scalia laments,
"[w]e will have totality of the circumstances tests and balancing
modes of analysis with us forever - and for my sins, I will proba-
bly write some of the opinions that use them."78 However, before
courts rush into weighing grand values on a grand scale and re-
solving issues of the utmost importance to the allocation of
power between the branches, with a method no more sophisti-
cated than what the political branches typically utilize, serious
reflection should be given to judicial restraint. This is not
merely for the courts to consider, but also for those who frame
institutions like the OIC, which inevitably diverts many ques-
tions regarding presidential privilege and immunity to the
courts, rather than the political branches.
B.Political Questions:
Shortly after the decision in United States v. Nixon and Presi-
dent's Nixon's resignation, the UCLA Law Review held a sympo-
sium of prominent constitutional scholars who were asked to
comment on the decision. 79 While most scholars focused on the
Court's actual decision, Professors Paul Mishkin and Gerald
Gunther presciently were troubled by the Court's role in deciding
the case at all. Although cautious in their opinions given that
the events were still so raw at the time, Professor Mishkin as-
serted that the "fundamental question" of the case was "whether
77 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733-34 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis in original).
78 See Scalia, Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 72, at 1187.
79 See Akhil Amar, Should We Ditch the Independent Prosecutor Law?, Message #3,
SLATE MAG., Feb. 17, 1999. In critiquing the OIC and related issues, Professor Akhil
Amar has questioned the relevance of comments made by prominent constitutional
scholars 25 years ago in the aftermath of Watergate: "If you want to play the name game,
let's look at who's who in con law today, and where they stand." Id.; Akhil Amar, Should
We Ditch the Independent Prosecutor Law?, Message #5, SLATE MAG., Feb. 18, 1999. In
addition, Amar has shown skepticism regarding the supposedly stale comments of consti-
tutional scholars who are now over the age of 70, and argued that "today's best and most
active scholars see things differently than did lawyers 25 years ago." Id. Putting aside
Aside from looking forward with great relish to the day when these comments get shot
back at a septuagenarian Amar, we respectfully disagree with Professor Amar. In fact,
the reactions to Watergate and the accuracy of the forethought given at that time is ex-
tremely illuminating, as we will attempt to show, of present debates.
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the Court should have taken the case in the first place," 80 and
Professor Gunther concluded that the case "tended to encourage
reliance on courts" and "cast doubts on the capacity of other
branches to resolve constitutional issues." 81  A more harsh
statement by Gunther of the same sentiment was that "some of
the added strength of the Court has been achieved - unneces-
sarily, unfortunately and unwisely - at the expense of the most
emaciated and deserving of the three branches, the legisla-
ture."82
The concerns recognized 24 years ago in the Nixon case were
superseded by a commitment to ethics in government, which
led to the creation of the OIC and a diversion of the investi-
gations of alleged executive misconduct to "independent" ac-
tors. Thus, justifying his investigation, Independent Coun-
sel Kenneth Starr testified to Congress that questions of
executive privilege were purely questions of law, suitable not
for "polls" and the "talk show circuit," but for the courts.
Speaking for the OIC, Starr stated: "We are officers of the
court who live in the world of the law. We have presented
our cases in court, and with very rare exception, we have
won."83
The Nixon White House, however, raised valid concerns about
the assumption that a claim of privilege is really a "classic ques-
tion[s] of law" and "appropriate for judicial resolution." Rather,
the White House suggested that the use of subpoenas as a vehi-
cle to test privileges was merely an effort to co-opt judicial proc-
esses into fundamentally political matters.
In effect, court process is being used as a discovery tool for
the impeachment proceedings - proceedings which the Con-
stitution clearly assigns to the Congress, not to the courts.
This is so because of the particular relationship which has
evolved among the Special Prosecutor, the district court and
the House Judiciary Committee .... [As] a result, there has
been a fusion of two entirely different proceedings: one, the
criminal proceeding involving various individual defendants,
and the other the impeachment proceeding involving the
80 See Mishkin, supra note 65, at 90.
81 Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case
and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30, 33 (1974).
82 Id. at 30.
83 Testimony of Kenneth W. Starr, House Judiciary Committee, Nov. 19, 1998.
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President. The first lies in the courts; the second lies in the
Congress.84
The "fusion" of court process and impeachment was institu-
tionalized with the OIC, which has a statutory duty to refer to
the House of Representatives "substantial and credible evidence"
that "may constitute grounds for an impeachment."85 As an in-
stitution, the OIC will turn to the courts to demand information
from the President, thrusting before the judiciary difficult issues
of executive privilege and immunity, and if grave wrongdoing is
found, the evidence is forwarded to the House.
However, as Professor Mishkin put it, it is "certain that the in-
stitution of our Government formally charged with the responsi-
bility of dealing with a miscreant President is the Congress." 86
Similarly, Gunther referred to the impeachment proceedings in
the House Judiciary Committee as "preeminent" in comparison
to the Court's hearing of United States v. Nixon.87 The political
nature of deciding issues of presidential privilege and immunity
arises from the Constitution's vesting of the "sole" power of im-
peachment and the "sole" power of trial in the House and the
Senate respectively. Such delegation fits into the Court's doc-
trine of "political questions," which includes those situations
where there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department."88 When
an OIC or any other executive official is investigating presiden-
tial wrongdoing, that official is not merely investigating the po-
tential criminal liability of the President; that official is gather-
ing evidence that could possibly be used to impeach and convict
the President. The "textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment" of impeachment and removal to the political branches,
will at some point, irreconcilably conflict with prosecutorial ef-
forts to attain evidence of criminal wrongdoing in the White
House through court processes. Even Kenneth Starr, who oth-
erwise draws bright lines between law and politics, admits as
much. 89
84 Id. at 328.
85 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1998) (stating duties and responsibilities of OIC).
86 See Mishkin, supra note 65, at 90.
87 See Gunther, supra note, 81 at 33.
88 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)).
89 In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs on April 14,
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Congressional pressure to compel presidential action is largely
undervalued by commentators who have fixated only on Con-
gress's contempt and impeachment powers. Congress has many
powers other than impeachment or citation to get an executive to
comply with a subpoena that do not require any branch of gov-
ernment to say definitively "what the law is." For example, Con-
gress may stall legislation that the President favors, hold up his
or her nominations, expand its investigations, cut back funding
of favored projects, and then - only if it gets mad enough - im-
peach the President. In fact, the third article of impeachment
against Richard Nixon was for contempt, defiance of subpoenas
for materials "deemed necessary by the Committee in order to
resolve by direct evidence fundamental, factual questions relat-
ing to Presidential direction, knowledge, or approval of actions
demonstrated by other evidence to be substantial grounds for
impeachment of the President."90
B. Forcing the Issues:
The shift in perspective over the role of courts in resolving po-
litically charged issues owes to numerous changes in the past 25
years relating to the role of courts, distrust of government, and a
general tendency towards litigiousness. However, it is also due
in no small part to the creation of an Office of Independent
Counsel. It is fair to ask where we would be if there had never
been such an office as the Special Prosecutor or the OIC. What if
the only investigations of presidential misbehavior were confined
to Congress? Based on what little case law exists, the courts
have shown great restraint when Congress demands evidence of
presidential communications. As one court envisioned its role,
"judicial intervention should be delayed until all possibilities for
settlement have been exhausted."91 If impeachment proceedings
1999, Kenneth Starr questioned the wisdom of 28 U.S.C. Section 595(c), which requires
and OIC to report to Congress "any substantial and credible information for which such
independent counsel receives... that may constitute grounds for an impeachment." Starr
remarked that "this responsibility further politicizes Independent Counsel investiga-
tions," and "[m]ore important, impeachment is a central, nondelegable Congressional
duty."
90 See Gunther, supra note 81, at 35 (quoting third article of impeachment).
91 Id. at 152. Compare Senate Select Committee, 498 F.2d at 731, which preceded
United States v. Nixon, and held that the President did not have to turn over tapes to a
Senate committee because the Senate committee had not demonstrated that the tapes
were "demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions."
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were to commence, the courts would also have no role, as the
"sole power" of impeachment and trial is vested in the House and
the Senate. 92 If the President were to resign or be removed, he
or she may be criminally prosecuted, at which point questions of
privilege and immunity would no longer intrude on the "sole
power" of impeachment. Unless the courts were to take an ex-
pansive view of their role in brokering congressional requests for
information from the executive, which so far they have not, the
political branches would be largely responsible for negotiating
the scope of any executive privilege and immunity. As will be
argued shortly, there are many advantages to this arrangement.
The OIC alters the balance because it can force issues upon
the courts, which under the authority of United States v. Nixon,
the courts are compelled to decide. Once those decisions are
reached, the scope of executive power is set as a matter of consti-
tutional law. We will then know "what the law is," but that
knowledge may do us more harm than good. The knowledge
comes from imprecise balancing that - once fixed - cannot
easily be undone. Contrast this with the alternative - a negoti-
ated settlement between Congress and the Executive - which
may provide an example for the future, but does not bear the
force of law. Of course, the actual doctrine of presidential com-
munications privilege is so amorphous and ad hoc that perhaps
there is very little constitutional definition attained in any par-
ticular case. However, if the OIC persistently litigates the issues
(and the White House persistently asserts the privilege), even
the most ad hoc balancing test will begin to produce results that
sharply define executive power. As Judge Leventhal noted in the
D.C. Circuit's retreat from a dispute between the executive and
the Congress over information, a court can apply the balance of
United States v. Nixon, which "selects a victor, and tends there-
after to tilt the scales. ' 93
In short, our concern is that the courts and political branches
have been pressed into paying too little respect for Chief Justic
Marshall's actual conclusion in Marbury. It may "emphatically
be the province and duty of the courts to say what the law is," 94
92 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. at 706.
93 United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
94 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
704 (1974).
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but it is also emphatically their duty to do so only when neces-
sary. Courts have a duty to avoid unnecessarily deciding consti-
tutional issues, because it is their duty to interpret - not make
- law, and to do otherwise is counter-majoritarian. 95 Even
when forced to decide constitutional issues, the narrowest possi-
ble ground has properly been advocated as the best, particularly
when the limits of presidential power are at stake.96 Judicial
"minimalism" is likewise urged "when the Court is dealing with
an issue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply
and on which the nation is in flux (moral or otherwise)."97 The
institution of the OIC under Kenneth Starr may or may not have
been at war with President Clinton, but its functioning was
plainly at war with these principles.
B. Summary
The Court has resolved issues of presidential privilege and
immunity through largely a legislative weighing of interests.
This sub-optimal judicial method, while defensible, becomes
much more suspect when the Court intrudes on the constitu-
tional prerogatives of the political branches, in particular, the
"sole power" of the House and the Senate to impeach and try the
President. The consequences of the Court's arguably precipitous
intrusion into this area in United States v. Nixon, has now been
compounded by the OIC's vigorous pursuit of legal decisions.
The OIC has stepped outside the bounds of constitutional ac-
commodation by forcing courts to decide issues of presidential
privilege and immunity that might not have been otherwise de-
termined as matters of binding constitutional law. In doing so,
one unaccountable institution, the OIC, has caused matters of
fundamental constitutional interpretation to be decided by an-
other unaccountable institution, the judiciary. This approach
has had, and could have, profound effects upon the nation's ac-
countable branches. If there are serious benefits to be achieved
95 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 (1997) (indicating constitutional questions
do not automatically cause denial of jurisdiction by Court).
96 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981) (citing Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); see also Jones, 520 U.S. at 690 (re-
jecting formulation of rule of constitutional law broader than that presented by particu-
lar facts).
97 See Sunstein, supra note 69, at 8.
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by having politically accountable institutions weigh in on ques-
tions of presidential privilege and immunity, then this system
must be altered.
IV.THE PUBLIC'S NEEDS
It is clear that presidential privilege and immunity are based
on a balance of interests. So far, we have considered principally
the interests of the Executive Branch and the President. In the
decisions regarding presidential privilege and immunity, the ju-
diciary has taken it upon itself to gauge public and other institu-
tional interests in comparison with interests asserted by the
President. Such interests, at the most general level, fall under
the rubrics of truth and justice. As President Nixon so
(in)famously acknowledged, the American people have a right to
know if their President is a crook. In other words, the American
people have a right to know the "truth" about the President, if
there is reasonable suspicion that the President is a lawbreaker.
This section deals with precisely how a system for dealing with
miscreant Presidents should go about representing peoples' de-
sire for truth and justice with respect to the President. Again,
Independent Counsel Starr has some unique ideas on this issue,
as does one of President Clinton's lawyers. The best system,
however, would minimize the role of lawyers and the judiciary so
that "the people" can help inform their representatives of where
the presidential privilege balance should be struck.
A. The Public's Interest in Divining Truth Through the Legal
System:
In a speech intended to reflect his views as Independent Coun-
sel, 98 Kenneth Starr had harsh words for the current legal cul-
ture.and urged a return to a more dignified past in which law-
yers had a near spiritual sense of duty to the truth-seeking
function. Starr invoked the image of Atticus Finch 99 as someone
who stood "very bravely in the pursuit of truth," and who "em-
98 Federal News Service, June 1, 1998, speech to the Mecklenburg Bar Foundation in
Charlotte, North Carolina,
99 See HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). Atticus Finch was a fictional
lawyer who courageously represented a black defendant wrongfully accused of raping a
white woman in a small, racist community.
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bodied two of the most important, and indeed noble values of our
system, loyalty to the client and yet respect for truth." Starr
coyly noted that "[flor Atticus, these two values were not in con-
flict," and Starr would later make similar observations that the
same holds true for government lawyers.
As for lawyers who find themselves conflicted between truth
and loyalty, Starr suggested that those who make the mistake of
adopting a "hired gun" role for their clients are those most likely
to "pay less than scrupulous regard for the truth." When law-
yers opt for too much loyalty and too little respect for truth, he
explained, they are selling out the "moral foundation" and "pri-
mary goal" of our judicial system. For Starr, the only objective of
the public in an investigation of an executive official was to know
the truth, and thus the question for him regarding assertions of
privilege or immunity was a simple one: "[A]t what point does a
lawyer's manipulation of the legal system become an obstruction
of truth?" The answer, of course, is that any privilege that limits
the flow of information will in some sense obstruct the truth.
Accordingly, with respect to government attorneys, Starr's posi-
tion is absolute: "[The] public servant lawyer owes a duty not to
any individual, but to the people as a whole" to allow the truth to
be discovered. Accordingly, he asserted that the government
lawyer has a "special obligation," that counsel to an individual or
corporation does not have, to "the people and to the law." That
special obligation - not to mention what Starr calls the lawyer's
"conscience" - "requires disclosure; not hiding, disclosure." Al-
though Starr never explicitly linked the two, in many respects,
his vision of the government lawyer is the same as his descrip-
tion of Atticus Finch: duty-bound to the client and to truth, and
those duties do not conflict. Because "the people" are the client,
no privilege should ever be asserted to obstruct their desire for
truth-seeking.
Not surprisingly, the counsel for President Clinton, drew a far
different conclusion about what best serves the public's interest.
Calling Starr's evocation of Atticus Finch simply "too much," the
President's counsel, David Kendall, offered his own lessons from
To Kill a Mockingbird. 00 Kendall emphasized that Atticus "de-
100 David E. Kendall, To Distort a Mockingbird, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1998, at A25
(noting even most unpopular defendants are protected by bill or rights).
[Vol. 14:15
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY
fended his client fearlessly, skillfully and energetically in the
face of community hostility." Perhaps more importantly, Atticus
"knew that 'truth' was not the sole possession of the district at-
torney's office, that the procedural protections of the Bill of
Rights belong to even the most unpopular of defendants, and
that it was his duty to defend his client against a hostile
world."10 1
In Kendall's view, resolving the truth of the question of
whether Atticus Finch's client was actually innocent, was only
one value to be balanced against some equally important inter-
ests such as fairness, ethical treatment of individuals having in-
formation about the case, and protecting the system of truth-
finding from abusive practices. To make his point, Kendall of-
fered his suspicion of how the Office of Independent Counsel
might have prosecuted the black rape defendant in To Kill A
Mockingbird, concluding that "prosecutors and their apologists
would have hectored Atticus at every turn for blocking the 'truth'
by insisting on his client's procedural rights."'102
Kendall's critique of Starr's speech was not a systematic refu-
tation of everything Starr had argued, but others rose to Ken-
dall's side, including Geoffrey Hazard:
Mr. Starr's claim is not only ludicrous; it is pernicious ....
Even though no lawyer should be party to perjury, defense
counsels have a duty to impede the search for truth in other
ways. They may advise their clients to invoke the constitu-
tion's Fifth Amendment, which means they can refuse to tes-
tify. They may argue that incriminating evidence is inad-
missible on technical grounds. Even if they know their
client to be guilty, defense lawyers are supposed to pick
holes in the prosecution's arguments, and to get their clients
101 At least one commentator has noted Kendall's peculiar, possibly Post Modern, use
of quotation marks around "truth." See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Is Starr Flouting Settled Prac-
tice?, NA'L J., June 15, 1998, at 1 (noting that Kendall's use of quotation marks "seems
redolent of the comforting rationalization voiced by some in the defense bar that ultimate
truth is so elusive as to be unknowable, and is thus of little concern to a defense lawyer").
It is all too ironic, two months after Kendall wrote his retort to Starr, that in President
Clinton's grand jury testimony he spoke of how two rational people could give conflicting
descriptions of the same events and each be absolutely convinced they are telling the
truth. His example of such an occurrence: Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill.
102 See Kendall, supra note 100. Like Starr's use of Atticus Finch, Kendall's analogy
may also be a bit "too much." By Kendall's account, President Clinton is an illiterate,
disabled, and unjustly accused black rape defendant, and Starr is the racist Southern
judicial system.
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off. 103
All of what Professor Hazard says is true, except it does not
really address how this relates to inquiries about the holder of a
nationally elected office in his representative capacity. Yes, Bill
Clinton, as an individual, has a right to all procedural protec-
tions that protect any United States citizen, but Bill Clinton, as
President of the United States, may also have duties to coordi-
nate branches of government that regular citizens do not have.
For all of the untrue statements that President Nixon may have
made about his role in the Watergate scandal, one thing he said
was correct: the American people have a right to know if their
President is a crook.
B. Who's Representing "the People?"
Neither Starr nor Kendall offer any real insight into how the
people have actually been represented in fights between the
President and the OIC over privilege. Their views, appropriate
to their roles, were partisan and law-based. Starr refers to the
public as the "client" of a government lawyer, and as OIC, Starr
would be representing the public. However, critiques of the lack
of accountability, i.e. connection to the public, of the OIC are le-
gion. As for Kendall, he operated as the President's private at-
torney. His loyalties run solely to William Jefferson Clinton. In
defining the "public," both looked into a crowd, and saw only
their friends. Neither attorney - again because of his institu-
tional role - was obliged to consider the broader public's inter-
est in keeping resolution of the matter away from the courts.
Once a matter gets to court the public's interest is already af-
fected. The court, once seized with an issue, must assess the
"need" for the subpoenaed information, and this "need," at base,
is an estimation of the social good. On the one hand, it is no
doubt true that "the people" deserve to know if their President is
a crook. Arguably, this could mean that if any government offi-
cial has information in this regard, disclosure is required. This
includes the Secret Service 104 and White House counsel. 105 Do
103 Geoffrey Hazard, The Worrying Zeal of Ken Starr, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1998, at
32.
104 See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining to create
"protective function privilege" to prevent secret service officers from testifying before
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"the people" really want such disclosure generally? Did "the
people" want such disclosure for purposes of investigating Presi-
dent Clinton? Most importantly, did "the people" want a court to
make this decision for them?
In fact, the real balance in the Clinton case appears to have
been struck by the public despite the insistence of courts for full
disclosure. The public ultimately was less concerned with get-
ting the absolute truth about President Clinton's behavior than
with protecting the office of the President from damage. The
persistent refusal of the American people to get outraged over
President Clinton's scandal resolved the question of political bal-
ance far better than a court could. 106 While the OIC and the
President's counsel arguably believed they were representing the
interests of a theoretical "public" when urging their positions in
court, the real public spoke through its political organs. It pres-
sured the Congress to shorten and end President Clinton's im-
peachment without a conviction, regardless of the truth or falsity
of the allegations, because in this instance its interest in pro-
tecting the presidency was paramount. In the Nixon case, the
public struck a different balance. The real public, acting through
Congress and opinion polls, was in the best position to resolve
these questions of delicate political balancing without any defini-
tive statement of "what the law is."
C. Building a Better System:
If the OIC vanishes with the expiration of the statute, as so
many people have urged, an institution devoted to settling dis-
putes over executive power in the courts will be gone. Congress
will feel the loss, and rather than shouldering the burden of
oversight and investigation itself, the people's representatives
may simply produce OIC-lite. As Norman Ornstein explains,
grand jury investigating presidential wrongdoing). But see Rubin v. U.S., 119 S.Ct. 461,
461-65 (1998) (Breyer, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari) ('[O]ne could reasonable
believe that the law should take special account of the obvious fact that serious physical
harm to the President is a national calamity-by recognizing a speical governmental
privilege where needed to help avert that calamity.").
105 See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding White
House Counsel do not have same privileges and immunities as do private counsel); ac-
cord In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 926 (8th Cir. 1997).
106 We accept the public's view for better or worse. Indeed, one of us considers it de-
cidedly for the better, and the other thinks it decidedly for the worse. We agree, however,
that neither of us is better qualified than the people to speak for "the people."
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Washington has a "numbingly familiar pattern" of conduct when
it comes to political scandals:
There are press reports of alleged scandal, followed almost
immediately by opposing partisans calling reflexively for ap-
pointment of an independent counsel to underscore the
gravity of the alleged offenses. The press has not only in-
creased its coverage of scandal but it has also joined the par-
tisans by making reflexive calls for independent counsels in
editorial pages.... Next come the network Sunday talk
shows... showcasing the allegations of scandal and asking
every guest, regardless of affiliation, whether he or she sup-
ports the appointment of an independent counsel. Shortly
thereafter, a prominent member of the President's party
states his or her support of the appointment of an independ-
ent counsel, making front-page news and generating further
calls for an independent counsel by members of the other
party and The New York Tmes .... 107
As Ornstein goes on to explain, calling for an independent
counsel is the "clean hands" approach, "facially, a request for an
independent counsel is not the same as a criminal accusation
without any proof other than allegations in the press," yet it may
have the same smearing effect. 108
In our view, Congress must be broken of this habit, or it is in-
evitable that power over presidential communications privilege
and immunity will be completely ceded to the judiciary. If this
happens, the people will have their demands for Presidential in-
formation and accountability mediated by the most unaccount-
able actors in government. The current passive role of Congress
is, in our view, insufficient and far too dependent on institutions
like the OIC. In many ways, the dilemma our government faces
is little different from the dilemma poignantly described by Pro-
fessor Mishkin shortly after United States v. Nixon:
Leaving the job to the Congress entailed the risk that it
might not be done - or done right or soon enough. But the
Court's stepping in meant a self-fulfillment of the prophecy
that Congress would not succeed, and thus a further under-
mining of the already insufficient stature and strength of
107 Norman J. Ornstein, Doing Congress's Dirty Work, 86 GEO. L. J. 2179, 2191
(1998) (emphasizing familiar pattern of political scandals).
108 Id. at 2192.
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the Legislative Branch. It is a truth that responsibility can
only be developed by running the risks of failure - or suc-
cess. 109
Because Congress is responsible to the people (unlike the OIC
and unlike the judiciary), Congress should balance the interests
at issue in presidential privilege and immunity. Congress can
legislatively grant the President whatever privileges and immu-
nities it so desires, as long as it does not intrude on the constitu-
tional minimum that has been set by the judiciary. If Congress
assumes these burdens, and does away with the OIC, the judici-
ary will no longer run the ever-present risk of applying the prin-
ciples of United States v. Nixon, selecting winners and losers
among the branches, and forever tilting the scales. Executive
power will be left with an elasticity and malleability that best
serves the many and varied problems it must address. 110
CONCLUSION
If the Independent Counsel statute is not renewed this year,
then perhaps the anxious cries of "Wolf." can stop. However, this
nation's experience with the OIC has illuminated many funda-
mental concerns over how questions of presidential power should
be addressed. The Office of Independent Counsel has urged de-
velopment of a bright line between law and politics. In doing so,
it has not hesitated to force the judiciary to decide issues of ex-
ecutive privilege and power, contemplated indicting a sitting
President who survived impeachment, and may yet refer that
constitutional question to the judiciary. While the judiciary can
and has addressed questions of this nature, it brings to their
resolution little more than a method of ad hoc balancing of presi-
dential versus public needs. In the process, the judiciary usurps
the powers, at times the "sole" powers, of a coordinate branch of
government.
In our view, a healthier system would strive for more public
accountability, given that so much generalized weighing of public
interest is required, and would also strive to minimize constitu-
109 See Mishkin, supra note 65, at 91.
110 The President also bears responsibility for intrusions on his power. The OIC was
established by laws, passed by Congress and signed by Presidents, including President
Clinton
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tional answers as to "what the law is." Traditionally, courts
have exercised restraint when Congress demands information
from the President and the President refuses, and traditionally,
Congress and the President have negotiated solutions. When
courts demand information from the President, it may not be
easy to exercise restraint. The guiding principles of United
States v. Nixon are not principles of restraint. However, if a sys-
tem is in place that minimizes recourse to the judiciary (a system
without an OIC), and instead encourages recourse to Congress,
the judiciary will be restrained as a result.
When the OIC begs for courts to compel the President to dis-
close information so that the public can know whether or not the
President is a crook, the OIC is a wolf in sheep's clothing: surely
the people want to know if their President is a crook and so the
demand seems appealing on its surface. But the people should
turn to Congress, not to the courts, for this politically delicate
task. Least of all, the people should not be led to the doorstep of
the White House (or the President's private study) by a well-
intended but politically disconnected OIC, unless the people re-
alize they are not being led there by a sheep. Sheep, by their
very nature, are not leaders.
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